Micro-generation in conflict: The conditions necessary to power economic development in rural Afghanistan by James D. McLellan (7214042) & Richard Blanchard (1251333)
AIMS Energy, 6(2): 339–357. 
DOI: 10.3934/energy.2018.2.339 
Received: 08 January 2018  
Accepted: 19 April 2018 
Published: 23 April 2018 
http://www.aimspress.com/journal/energy 
 
Research article 
Micro-generation in conflict: The conditions necessary to power 
economic development in rural Afghanistan 
James D. McLellan and Richard E Blanchard* 
Centre for Renewable Energy Systems Technology, Loughborough University, UK 
* Correspondence: Email: r.e.blanchard@lboro.ac.uk; Tel: +441509227190. 
Abstract: Access to reliable electricity eludes many poor rural Afghan communities despite plentiful 
renewable resources. Micro-generation seems particularly well suited to Afghanistan’s mountainous, 
decentralised society but even with substantial investment since 2001 it has not lived up to 
expectations. Recognising the causes are likely to dwell in the human (rather than technical) domain, 
this study takes a qualitative, soft systems approach to deriving and validating the necessary 
conditions that might improve the success rate of micro-generation projects in enabling sustainable 
economic development. It acknowledges the governance limitations inherent in fragile states and the 
significance of the community as the most stable element of society, putting the latter at the centre of 
its thinking. Those conditions identified as critical are summarised as: a holistic approach that sees 
micro-generation as a component of broader economic development; an environment safe enough for 
project build and operation, and for the markets necessary for wealth creation; and external support 
to build community capacity to fund and maintain schemes through-life. These conditions are likely 
to have relevance for other fragile states; the next step is to develop them in the field before 
deployment as part of a comprehensive approach to poverty alleviation in Afghanistan and similar 
states. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Overview 
Afghanistan scores poorly against almost every development indicator including access to 
electricity. One third of the population is recorded as being food insecure and approximately three-
quarters of rural Afghan households do not have access to a reliable source of electricity. Grid-level 
generation and distribution is limited to a few urban centres only. In keeping with the Afghan 
tradition of decentralisation, energy is typically acquired and used at small community or dwelling 
level. For most rural Afghans that has meant wood, dung and possibly diesel. Since 2001 
Afghanistan has been at, or near, the top of the development agenda for many of the world’s most 
affluent nations [1]. Those states, having committed military forces, followed strategies that viewed 
rural development and counter insurgency as indivisible [2]. In other words, they paid for 
development programmes, including rural electrification, to reduce the risk of military and political 
failure. It is too early to judge the success or otherwise of Western efforts in Afghanistan but rural 
development, including access to electricity, remain important factors in the viability and 
development of the Afghan state. Moreover, progress in those sectors has not lived up to 
expectations; a recent national survey found access to electricity to be the second biggest “local” 
concern amongst the rural population after unemployment. This despite Afghanistan’s hydro 
potential alone being assessed as up to 25 GW. Installed capacity is well under 1 GW, hydro 
providing most of Afghanistan’s electrical power [3,4]. Despite sustained investment, there remains 
much to be achieved. Western military intervention has now ended; and thus 2015 marked a new 
beginning for Afghanistan’s civil society. Increasingly it will need to find its own solutions to rural 
development, and by implication, access to electricity. Through its focus on micro generation, this 
study is intended to play a part in meeting that challenge. Its unique contribution lies in its 
methodology and its perspective: it will take a soft systems approach to understanding, from a 
community viewpoint, the necessary conditions for micro generation to successfully support 
economic development in rural Afghanistan. Its objectives are: 
(1) To understand the Afghan rural community context; 
(2) To derive a series of models representing facets of community micro generation. From these, to 
extract candidate conditions for successful micro generation; 
(3) To validate findings by comparing model outputs with real-world studies;  
(4) To elicit the critical and desirable conditions for successful micro generation in rural 
Afghanistan, and to comment on their broader applicability for other fragile states. 
1.2. Literature review 
1.2.1. Electrification and poverty alleviation 
The link between electrification and poverty alleviation is assumed widely in literature although 
often with little substantiating evidence. One exception is the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2004, 
which states that “energy is a prerequisite to economic development” [5]. It then links this statement 
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to electrification by plotting human development indicators against electrical consumption, claiming 
a strong, non-linear correlation between access to electricity and human development. This means 
that disproportionate human development gains are associated with modest increases in access to 
electricity. But the report is careful not to ascribe this to a one-way causal relationship; instead it 
contends that energy development is a cause and effect of economic growth.
1
 The direction of this 
correlation is the subject of a number of studies, summed up in a review of evidence conducted on 
behalf of the UK’s Department for International Development [6]. It found “a strong causal 
relationship between consumption of modern energy and GDP growth but is inconclusive as to the 
direction of the causality and the magnitude of the impact”. In an older study, Foley takes a less 
nuanced view, asserting that “rural electrification does not cause development” [7]. He does, 
however, acknowledge it is an essential enabler. Supported by some convincing arguments, and in 
agreement with others (Kirubi et al., World Bank), he goes on to say that timing the introduction of 
electricity to a community is critical: it must neither be too early (when it may not be economically 
viable); nor too late (when its absence stifles development) [8,9]. This implies that community 
electrification must be closely linked with economic development. 
1.2.2. Global factors influencing successful electrification 
In response to the challenges of poverty and limited infrastructure in the developing world, the 
cost-effectiveness advantages of standalone, renewable generation are made clear by Mainali et al., 
Lahimer et al. and others [10,11]. But successful electrification is more than just selecting the 
optimum technology; it depends also on the aligning of a range of economic, social, political and 
other human factors. In her study for the IEA, Niez conducted a top-down assessment of 
government-led electrification programmes in several emerging economies which included a detailed 
review of conditions required for successful stand-alone systems in a rural setting [12]. She found 
that a detailed understanding of the population, sustained governmental support, market 
infrastructure, community support and affordability all underpin success. A similar paper on behalf 
of the World Bank examined the generic reasons for failure to provide universal access to  
electricity [13]. Its findings support Niez’s assertion that government commitment and financial 
viability are critical for successful electrification. Indeed Foley, Bailey et al., Peskett, Zalengera et al. 
and others agree (or at least imply) that organisational, economic and social constraints are likely to 
be key factors [14–16]. Given this weight of consensus it is perhaps surprising that the human 
dimension has not always attracted academic interest. As recently as 2012 Schillebeeckx et al. 
assessed 232 papers on this subject, finding that most focused on technical and institutional 
perspectives rather than understanding economic viability and user need [17]. This suggests that 
micro generation in the developing world is still being addressed largely as a top-down policy or 
engineering problem rather than a more holistic societal issue.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Energy development is defined as the transition to modern fuels, and then to mature energy end-use. 
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1.2.3. Micro generation in Afghanistan and other failing states 
Afghanistan offers an interesting but challenging micro generation case study. Despite plentiful 
renewable resources [18,19], its rural communities feel the combined pressures of conflict, poverty 
and weak governance. The limited capacity and reach of government is of particular interest. Much 
of the literature reviewed here asserts the importance of effective instruments of government to form 
and implement policy in support of rural electrification. However, states considered to be failed or 
failing are characterised by the suspension of government functions [20]. Indeed, as a subject, rural 
electrification in failed states or areas of conflict seems poorly targeted by research despite 
predictions that intra-state violence will be a re-occurring theme [21]. It is touched upon by Weihe in 
his examination of the phenomena of local co-operatives where central government cannot deliver 
economic and social development [22]. He concurs with Neiz’s finding that local communities must 
own their means of power generation, although in the case of failing states it may be aid agencies and 
other non-state actors that act as facilitators, rather than government. The subject of electrification in 
rural Afghanistan is less short of commentators. Several wide-ranging reports have been published 
that address the successes and failures of Afghanistan rural micro generation since 2001 [23–26]. 
The Afghan government itself has produced several policy documents that show a reasonable grasp 
of both human and technical challenges [27–29]. In conjunction with more general international 
literature, these will be used to validate this study. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Assumptions 
Several assumptions are necessary to deliver meaningful outputs within the larger subject of 
Afghan development. This is an imperfect approach since development is a multi-faceted challenge; 
nevertheless, to derive useful conclusions in this study the problem must first be constrained to a 
sensible degree. These assumptions are described as followed in sections 2.1.1–2.1.4. 
2.1.1. Micro generation contribution to economic development 
This study addresses micro generation’s contribution to economic development. At its most 
basic level, it assumes economic development is a positive and desirable goal. This may seem self-
evident but in the conflict of ideas in Afghanistan these views are not necessarily shared by the entire 
population.
2
 It focuses on improving micro generation’s contribution to near term (<5 years) 
economic development because the need is severe and urgent. The interaction of micro generation 
with longer term evolvers of aspiration, such as education, female emancipation and exposure to 
media, is implied but not considered in detail. These aspects would be appealing as a second stage to 
this paper (indeed Niez asserts such issues are highly relevant to long term economic  
development [12]). 
                                                 
2
 Some of the more extreme fundamentalist organisations in Afghanistan and the Middle East might be said to be pursuing anti-development agendas. 
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2.1.2. Community as the primary stable entity 
Afghanistan is classified as “highly fragile”. Such states are characterised by several dimensions 
of instability including: factionalisation; public service failure; legal violations; security failures; and 
economic instability. Other examples include Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Central African Republic, Somalia, 
and to add complexity, these states are often not in equilibrium; that is to say they may be becoming 
more or less stable, the direction and speed of which will also affect micro generation and economic 
development [30]. The literature review points to a gap here in that most papers addressing 
developing world electrification focus on high-level policy-centric solutions. These imply that 
governments control their own territory, provide and enact policy, and act in the interests of the 
population. But in highly fragile states this is often not the case. In Afghanistan, long term instability 
means villages and tribal groups have frequently been left to devise and implement their  
own “policies” and to chart their own course through conflict. This is not to belittle the substantial 
progress made by the Afghan government in recent years, however parts of Afghanistan at least may 
have an uncertain future in terms of governance, see Appendix 1 [31]. In such volatile circumstances 
the community becomes the most stable element; the anchor of certainty for individuals. Accordingly, 
a key element of this study’s unique contribution is its focus on the community as the primary 
organisational and executive entity, situated in a context of political, economic and other instability. 
There is estimated to be ~24,000 such rural communities in Afghanistan, each unique but having 
some affinity at least with the following characteristics (further details at Appendix 1): 
(1) Traditional leadership structure; 
(2) Severe poverty-subsistence economy, food insecurity, very low incomes and levels of capital; 
(3) Under-employment; 
(4) Very low levels of education and skills. 
2.1.3. External organisations 
The capital and educational limitations hold particular relevance for micro generation and lead 
to the next assumption. It is very unlikely a typical rural Afghan community will have the finances 
and technical wherewithal to develop a micro generation scheme without the support of an external 
organisation. This may be a governmental body. But in another district or province, for reasons of 
limited capacity, security or allegiance, it may be a different organisation. In highly fragile states the 
government may be too weak to fulfil this role or may even deny development opportunities 
deliberately. This has been claimed by at least one minority group in Afghanistan and seems likely in 
other fragile states with deep social divides. The trend in Afghanistan seems to be toward increasing 
government capacity. But given the range of bodies, including Western Governmental  
Organisations (GOs), International Organisations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
and even NATO military forces, that have hitherto implemented micro generation projects, this 
demands a more open approach to defining which organisations might set policy and assist 
communities. For this study, the following external organisations are defined. The ambiguity is 
deliberate and in keeping with the primacy of the community in this study: 
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Overseeing Organisation (OO)—that which has decided to commission the delivery of micro 
generation to groups of rural communities, and which sets the policies for implementation. It is the 
guiding mind and the intellect behind the process. Typically, a central government department or a 
GO/IO/NGO. 
Enabling Partner (EP)—that which is providing practical assistance to individual communities 
to develop micro generation schemes. It may be one organisation, or many working together in a 
similar timescale for overall effect. Typically, a provincial or district government office, local NGO 
or contracted service provider.  
2.1.4. Other assumptions 
Micro-generation is a common but ill-defined term. This report uses the meaning: “...generation 
of electricity ... on a small scale, typically for domestic use and by methods that do not contribute to 
the depletion of natural resources...” [32]. There is no globally agreed scale and, in this context, it 
seems sensible to define by user community size. The Afghan Government delineation of 5000 
individuals will be used here, although most rural communities will be smaller [29]. Furthermore, in 
pursuing the goal of economic development this study targets community, rather than household 
level, micro generation as the latter risks marginalising the poorest. Conversely, inter-community 
schemes are a possibility and could work well where resource ownership is shared (for example a 
river). They are not addressed specifically here but will have much commonality with the 
conclusions. 
2.2. Soft systems approach 
Engineering feasibility studies and technology cost-effectiveness comparisons are well 
represented in developing world electrification literature however they address only one part of the 
problem. Reasons for success or failure in such challenging environments are typically traced to less 
deterministic factors: social; economic; political; and the like. In seeking to address these influences, 
this study is by nature a qualitative assessment. It steers away from quantitative problem-solving; 
instead, it seeks to find the combination of qualitative conditions that offers the best likelihood of 
success in the context of micro generation as an enabler for economic development [33].
3
 
Establishing these conditions requires an approach suited to the complex, untidy (in a systems sense) 
environment that is rural Afghanistan. A range of frameworks and methodologies were reviewed, 
including simpler “PESTLE” and variants, and “hard” and “soft” systems approaches.  
Checkland’s “Soft Systems Methodology” (SSM) was finally selected as it offered a process 
optimised for the kinds of unstructured human problems toward which the body of literature points. 
In Checkland’s words, these are conundrums that are characterised by a “feeling of unease, which 
cannot be explicitly stated without oversimplifying the problem” or put another way, a “mismatch 
between actuality and what is perceived might become actuality” [34]. This is a good description of 
the nature of this study, which does not seek to define a required outcome. Instead it acknowledges a 
                                                 
3
 The term condition is defined as 'a stipulation; something upon the fulfilment of which something else depends.'  
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feeling of unease, something like: surely micro generation could, and should, make more of a 
contribution to economic development in rural Afghanistan? It then sets about finding the conditions 
that could help unlock micro generation as a more effective contributor in narrowing this perceived 
mismatch. In essence, this study seeks to develop a range of conditions, based on a detailed 
understanding of the context. These independently-derived conditions are then compared with field 
reports, to both corroborate the independent conditions, and to spot potential new conditions that 
have not been noted in other studies. This process is shown in more detail at Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. SSM applied to micro generation in rural Afghanistan. 
Stage 1 was derived using a range of online sources, in a PESTLE format, to describe in detail 
the context. Stage 2 took forward the findings from Stage 1, into a graphical representation of a 
generic rural Afghan community. Combined, Stages 1 and 2 forced an intimate understanding of a 
generic rural Afghan community (within the constraints of a desktop study). Stages 3 and 4 are at the 
heart of the SSM approach. Stage 3 saw the development of a series of “holons” (or “plausible 
perspectives”) associated with micro generation. Twenty-two holons were devised, through an 
iterative process based on the contextual understanding developed at Stages 1 and 2. In keeping with 
the nature of this study, holons were rooted primarily in the community, however in recognition of 
the criticality of both OO and EP, several holons addressed perspectives relevant to those 
organisations. Thereafter, at Stage 4, individual holons were developed into a system description, 
then a conceptual system model. Each modelling process prompted new insights into other holons 
and their conceptual models; in this way, the models were refined through several cycles of review. 
From examination of each system model, a total of 151 candidate conditions for success (or opposing 
threat conditions) were identified. Predictably, many candidate conditions were duplicated across 
holons, necessitating the grouping of similar or identical candidate success and threat conditions. 
Again, this process was qualitative and iterative, care being taken not to lose the meaning of the 
original candidate conditions. These 46 grouped conditions were checked for feasibility, uniqueness 
and completeness then scored for their criticality to the success of micro generation as an enabler for 
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economic development, from the perspective of a rural Afghan community. A variety of micro 
generation studies were then selected against which to validate these independently-derived 
conditions. These were chosen to include a broad range of viewpoints, purposes and data regarding 
the success or otherwise of micro generation projects and these are described below. 
Specific to Afghanistan: 
(1) United States Agency for International Development: audit of 60 micro hydro schemes [26].  
(2) German International Development Agency: renewable energy sector capacity assessment [25]. 
(3) Afghan Government Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development: micro generation 
policy [27,28]. 
(4) Journal of Sustainable Development of Energy, Water and Environment Systems: survey of 421 
micro hydro installations [24]. 
(5) Afghan Government: energy sector strategy assessments of sector weaknesses [29]. 
(6) United States Department of Defense: results from 68 schemes were used to derive a distributed 
energy model [23]. 
International: 
(1) International Energy Agency: rural electrification policies in emerging economies [12]. 
(2) World Bank: addressing the electricity access gap in the developing world [13]. 
(3) UK Department for International Development and World Bank: best practices for sustainable 
micro hydro in developing countries [35]. 
From these reports, systematic analysis identified 86 validation conditions. Each SSM condition 
was scored 0–5 for the level of correlation with one or more validation conditions. The complete 
validation process is shown at Figure 2. It is fundamentally a qualitative comparison, in keeping with 
the nature of SSM and its emphasis on perspectives. Scoring allows importance and correlation to be 
ranked but further numerical manipulation is avoided as it risks losing meaning. 
 
Figure 2. Scoring and validation process. 
347 
AIMS Energy                                                                  Volume 6, Issue 2, 339–357. 
3. Results 
The findings from Stage 6 of the SSM process are shown below. Figure 3 shows conditions 
scoring in the highest tier; these are considered critical for success in rural Afghanistan. Figure 4 
shows conditions scoring “4” (referred to as “sub-critical”), without which success is deemed highly 
unlikely. Both are shown against an outline project timeline. 
 
Figure 3. Critical conditions for micro generation to contribute to economic development 
in rural Afghanistan. 
 
Figure 4. Sub-critical conditions for micro generation to contribute to economic 
development in rural Afghanistan. 
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4. Analysis and discussion  
4.1. Critical conditions 
Ten critical conditions were established. All correlated, entirely or partially, with conditions 
identified in field or policy reports and all are necessary but none, alone, is sufficient for success. Of 
course, the qualitative nature of this study and the critical and sub-critical conditions means that few 
derived conditions are binary in nature. Nevertheless, this does not detract from their importance. It 
will be apparent that many are universal in nature, in the sense that they are global requirements 
independent of context (for example sufficient resource). This study adds value by bringing to the 
fore those that are of the highest priority in rural Afghanistan, from a community perspective. This is 
analogous to Maslow’s “hierarchy of needs”, in that more developed states will assume the basic 
elements of stable government, literacy, business infrastructure etc are in place and instead focus on 
higher order, more evolved requirements. In contrast, the conditions identified here provide a 
glimpse of the baseline requirements for successful micro generation in the most tenuous of 
circumstances. These critical conditions group naturally into 3 themes: a holistic policy view; a 
sufficiently secure environment for project build, operation and wealth creation; and external support 
to build community capacity to fund and maintain schemes through-life. 
4.1.1. Condition 1: Holistic policy view 
The genesis of success in the context of this study, is a holistic view, originating from the OO, 
which sees micro generation as a component of a broader approach to economic development. 
Indeed, because it relies on wealth to fund its operation, electrification as an end in itself is almost 
certain to fail if not accompanied by activity to develop the community’s means to generate that 
wealth. This condition validated well. It is self-evident and recognised broadly in literature as a 
critical condition for creating the environment for the sustainable alleviation of poverty.  
4.1.2. Conditions 3 and 4: Sufficiently secure environment for build, operation and wealth creation 
These conditions are a mark of fragile states. Firstly, the community must have access to 
markets through which to sell the goods or services that have been enabled by a reliable electricity 
supply. This stems from the assumption that the typical Afghan community possesses very little in 
the way of indigenous wealth. It must rely on the export of textiles or dried fruit, or the service 
provided by a flour mill for example, to the wider world, to import wealth. Condition 3, access to 
markets, correlated only partially perhaps because it is assumed. However, the least developed, most 
fragile societies may experience, through violence or other causes, the regular disruption or even 
prolonged absence of markets and transport infrastructure that underpin movement of wealth. Even 
with the help of electricity to produce goods more efficiently, the typical community is still 
surrounded by similarly poor communities. Without markets to move goods and import wealth from 
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further afield, it is unlikely to make significant economic gains [36].
4
 Moving to Condition 4, 
through the life of a micro generation scheme violence is likely to touch the community itself and the 
businesses it tries to develop. The Taliban has been more accepting of development in recent years 
but there remains a significant threat to EPs (particularly to international staff) and the emergence of 
Islamic State could point to a more rejectionist, anarchic future across the region. Whatever the threat 
group (and it may be government forces in some states), the community leadership will need to keep 
the human threat below an acceptable threshold. Condition 4 is hard to judge; who can tell how a 
conflict will ebb and flow? Geography and allegiance will be factors, as will the leadership’s ability 
to steer a safe course between the warring sides (see section 4.2.2) [31]. Dialogue or armed 
protection may be sufficient but in the worst circumstances, the community’s best efforts may simply 
be overwhelmed by the tide of fighting. 
4.1.3. Conditions 2, 5–10: External support to build capacity to fund and maintain scheme through life 
Affordability begins with community ownership of sufficient renewable resource. Condition 2 
correlated only partially, again perhaps because it is assumed. Nevertheless, it must be satisfied and 
although much of rural Afghanistan is well served by rivers there will be many communities that are 
limited to more expensive and complex conversion technologies like solar PV. These may be less 
effective in meeting reliably and affordably; the capacity demands of businesses. Moving to 
Condition 5, severe poverty is a central and oft-repeated assumption in this study. It therefore follows 
that capital must be provided from an external source, in part or full, to fund the micro generation 
scheme build. This correlated well with Afghan policy documents but less so with other Afghanistan 
reports which tended to address lessons from implementation and operation phases, making the 
assumption that capital had already been provided. Condition 6 requires affordable operation by 
design. Implicit in this condition is that the EP designs the micro generation scheme since another 
characteristic of rural Afghan communities is an absence of education and technical skills. This is 
improving as the post-2001 education system infiltrates but rural Afghanistan still has one of the 
lowest literacy rates in the world. Explicit in this condition is that the design effort is focused on 
through life affordability. This is critical: in fragile states, like Afghanistan, lifetime subsidies are 
very unlikely to be practical. Through the life of a UK renewable energy tariff agreement (25 years), 
Afghanistan has had several violent regime changes and long periods of civil war. These conditions 
make tariff subsidies inappropriate; instead, to give the scheme the best chance of success, 
investment must be up-front, and the design optimised for low running costs. This condition also 
makes reference to “Anchor” funding, meaning a source of energy funding from outside the 
community, usually in support of a service like a school or health centre upon which the community 
can rely to provide uninterrupted “baseline” funding. This is highly desirable but, like subsidies, it 
may not be relied upon in the most fragile states. Conditions 8 and 9 focus on aspects of through life 
operation and maintenance. The former addresses more nebulous but nonetheless important 
requirements of having access to, and selecting suitable maintainers and operators. The  
                                                 
4
 There is a view that highly fragile states develop a form of extreme, unregulated market capitalism such as existed in Afghanistan during 1990-94. But 
this period was characterised by extreme poverty, concentration of wealth and the marketisation of violence; all highly undesirable outcomes. 
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phrase “access to” is a reference to the low skills base from which the maintainer must be found. Is 
the community large enough or educated enough to provide individuals with an aptitude for this 
work? “Selecting” refers to nepotism or power-base relationships which commonly drive 
appointments of this kind in Afghanistan. To give the best chance of success the maintainer/operator 
must be selected on merit rather than family ties. A succession plan is also vital; instability and 
limited healthcare make it prudent to have at least 2 individuals trained through the life of the scheme. 
Condition 9 lists more practical needs, specifically training, documentation and a route to spare parts. 
These are global requirements but made more difficult in Afghanistan by the general lack of 
education and the vulnerability and affordability of the supply chain. Finally, if the scheme is to be 
maintained and operated successfully it must be funded through life, to pay the maintainer and to buy 
parts. This is the subject of Conditions 7 and 10. For reasons discussed at Condition 6, through life 
subsidies are very unlikely to succeed. Instead, scheme operation must be self-funded. Condition 7 
requires the agreement of a tariff that is affordable, transparent and fair. In an environment rich with 
corruption, transparency will lend credibility, particularly if the rate is linked to an external index. 
Fairness implies that it will benefit the whole community, which may point to different tariffs 
depending on ability to pay. Local circumstances will dictate which model best suits but pan-
community buy-in will help lead to effective revenue collection, which is the subject of Condition 10. 
This requires similar transparency and fairness in the act of revenue collection itself. 
4.2. Sub-critical conditions 
4.2.1. Condition 11: Rehabilitation of existing micro generation infrastructure  
Condition 11 was missed by the SSM approach which did not consider improving existing 
inadequate or failed schemes. This is an important policy component, particularly in states like 
Afghanistan, where infrastructure has been damaged by conflict, as it offers a cheaper way to 
develop latent capacity, both physical and human.  
4.2.2. Conditions 12, 15, 16, 17: Nature of the OO, leadership and community 
Conditions 12, 15, 16 and 17 did not correlate directly with any validation source. These are 
typical “soft” human characteristics and show the uniqueness of an SSM approach. Without the 
checks and balances inherent in a more stable state, the nature of, and relationships between, the OO, 
the community leadership and the people it serves, appear highly relevant for micro generation and 
development. Research focused on economic outcomes in small Afghan villages suggests that 
effective, progressive leadership matters greatly in steering communities through instability and the 
breakdown of the state [31]. The same research backs up the notion of accountability, particularly 
where the leadership is economically less secure (or put another way, more equal), which makes it 
more likely to act in the interests of the whole community. This should not be a surprise: 
accountability driving better outcomes is a global constant (it underpins democracy). The 
relationship between OO and community is of similar consequence; the closer their goals are aligned, 
the greater the likelihood that the OO will act in the interests of the community. But where the  
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OO (which might be central government), or the community leadership, is isolated, predatory or 
seeking short-term gains, for example pacification in counter-insurgent operations, a positive 
outcome is expected to be less likely. Community stability also appears very relevant for sustainable 
success. A community that cannot unite in supporting and funding a scheme through life is unlikely 
to reap sustainable economic benefits, and there is plenty of potential for generational dissent in the 
introduction of technology into such a traditional environment. It is acknowledged that these 
conditions are both dynamic and very difficult to assess objectively. This perhaps explains why they 
don’t feature explicitly in the micro generation studies used for validation which tended to pick out 
more tangible conditions such as a lack of training or spare parts. Nevertheless, they could be 
inferred from higher level policy reports and are brought out in more general societal research. Thus, 
it is contended here that the nature of the OO, the leadership, and the community itself, and their 
relationships, is highly relevant to the likelihood of micro generation successfully enabling economic 
development. 
4.2.3. Conditions 13 and 14: OO Understands the context, and sets and enforces policies 
Conditions 13 and 14 make requirements on the OO to understand the environment in which it 
operates and to mandate various policies that increase the likelihood of success for individual 
communities. Condition 13 also requires that these policies are audited, and non-compliant EPs 
removed, to act an as incentive to drive up build standards. 
4.2.4. Condition 18: Alternative sources of electricity 
Condition 18 requires that alternative sources of electricity, including grid connection, are more 
expensive than micro generation. It can be argued that economic development is agnostic as to the 
source of its electricity so long as it is affordable (Conditions 5 and 8). But since this study is 
addressing micro generation specifically, it will have failed if displaced by a different source of 
cheaper electricity. 
4.2.5. Conditions 19–24: “Business” approach, dispute resolution and access to electrical devices 
The importance of a holistic “business” approach within the community is recorded at 
Conditions 19, 20, 22 and 23. Condition 21 (dispute resolution) is typical of less developed states 
where land and water rights may not be recorded. Suspension of government justice functions in 
highly fragile states exacerbates such disputes, whose resolution will have a bearing on longer term 
success. Finally, Condition 24 draws attention to the importance of electrical devices in turning 
electricity into profitable output. Without access to affordable machinery such as mills or looms, 
communities are limited to the economic benefits afforded by electrical lighting only. 
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4.3. Lower order conditions 
Summarising those conditions lower down the scale of importance, strong correlation was noted 
for those relating to community mobilisation, to encourage support for the scheme and to understand 
how to use electricity productively. These were deemed significant but did not attract a higher 
importance because the relatively high penetration of electrical goods like mobile phones and 
televisions indicates Afghans are already familiar with electricity and its uses [4]. Rushed 
implementation was deemed a risk to success, but only where the higher order conditions are not  
met (for example building capacity to run businesses). The dangers of corruption correlated well with 
other studies. It is, unfortunately, endemic in many fragile states but communities and businesses 
survive despite it. Of those conditions unique to validation literature, the creation of autonomous, 
apolitical organisations at each organisational level, featured often in higher level papers. This is a 
wise goal in the long term but of greater interest in this context are the natures of the various 
organisations and their relationships, and the running of the scheme in a “business-like” manner. It is 
the authors’ view that at this stage in Afghanistan’s development, in an environment of instability 
and traditional relationships, this typically-western approach will often be unrealistic at a community 
level. Similarly, the creation of open markets for micro generation is a sensible aspiration for longer 
term affordability, but less relevant in highly fragile states, where the investment necessary to sustain 
and develop such markets is unlikely to materialise. It will grow in importance when states transition 
from conflict, Rwanda being a good example, now an order further up the stability scale and seeing 
the benefits of private sector involvement [37]. 
4.4. Relevance for other highly fragile states 
To assess broader relevance for other highly fragile states, it is necessary to consider the 
assumptions made about Afghanistan that led to the aforementioned conditions. By definition fragile 
states share macro characteristics such as factionalisation; public service failure; legal violations; 
security failures; and economic instability. More significant in assessing wider relevance are the 
specific assumptions made about rural Afghan communities, since they are likely to act as 
discriminators. They are: traditional leadership structure; severe poverty; under-employment; and 
very low levels of education and skills. Perpetually fragile states, (for example Somalia, Sudan, 
Yemen) will share most or all of these characteristics and the conditions identified are likely to be 
applicable in their entirety. Other states that have descended into fragility from more stable 
antecedents offer a greater contrast. Iraq and Syria are good examples of such “fallen states”, sitting 
well above Afghanistan in terms of wealth, education and infrastructure. Re-examining the critical 
conditions identified at Figure 3, Table 1 gives a summary of relevance to these “fallen states”. It 
shows that half the critical conditions (marked in green) are essentially universal in nature, applicable 
across all fragile states. The other half (marked in yellow) remain important, but the challenge they 
present is likely to be tempered by pre-existing national characteristics, for example wealth, 
education and infrastructure, which may mean that fallen states require less intervention in order to 
meet these conditions. 
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Table 1. Critical condition applicability to “Fallen States”. 
Condition Applicability 
1. OO takes a holistic view of micro generation 
and business 
Relevant, although the nature of the challenge will be different. 
Fallen states are likely to have pre-existing business capacity, as 
well as more capital and infrastructure, than Afghanistan.  
2. Sufficient renewable resource Highly relevant in all circumstances. 
3. Access to markets Relevant. Physical threat to markets will be similar however more 
developed transport and business infrastructure in fallen states will 
ease the challenge of selling goods. 
4. Human threat reduced to acceptable level Highly relevant, unfortunately. 
5. Capital for micro generation build Relevant, although richer states like Iraq are more likely to be able 
to afford part or all of these costs. 
6. EP designs a micro generation system with 
affordable running costs 
Highly relevant. Subsidies are unlikely in fragile states so the 
community must bear the costs of operating the scheme. 
7. Agreed tariff model Highly relevant. Agreeing funding for running costs is critical. 
8. Suitable maintainer selected Relevant. Nepotism and power relationships are factors across 
fragile states although with higher levels of education generally, 
these factors are less likely to influence long term success.  
9. EP provides maintainer training & 
documentation 
Relevant, although higher levels of education will reduce the 
training burden. 
10. Effective revenue collection Highly relevant. Again, funding running costs is critical to success. 
4.5. Study limitations 
SSM is most often used in an iterative fashion through conversations with stakeholders. 
Applying it in a desktop study of this kind is valid, but its output is constrained to that derived, 
judged and validated by the authors. Without the direct voices of stakeholders, the “original thought” 
element is limited to secondary evidence and so this study can be considered a first step only in the 
evolution of useful output, a field phase being the next logical step in developing the proposed 
conditions. However, by way of balance, this shortcoming is common to all remote study 
methodologies. Furthermore, the authors assert that approaching this problem in a qualitative manner, 
validated against real-world studies, is worthwhile despite the challenges as it adds a new, softer 
perspective to a problem that has tended to be dominated by hard-systems analysis. And whilst the 
majority of understanding is derived from the references, one of the authors has first-hand experience 
of Afghanistan, which helped inform the soft systems process by lending a supporting validation 
perspective. Several other points are worthy of mention. The military intervention has generated an 
enormous quantity of literature however much of it is English language and western-authored with 
the bias that implies. Some Afghan government sources were used, but these are not necessarily 
representative of conditions on the ground. And not all the validation documents are from field 
studies; some are derived from policy or similar documents, removed one step at least from field 
work. Nevertheless, so far as possible within the constraints of a desktop study, it is contended that a 
reasonably accurate representation of rural Afghanistan has been derived, and that a meaningful 
outcome has been achieved. 
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5. Conclusions 
Bringing electrical power to bear usefully in fragile states is amongst the most demanding 
human problems in the field of renewable generation. Physical violence is the most obvious 
challenge, but the lack of stable governance arguably has greater influence. It prevents a 
conventional government-centric approach, instead forcing the community and other organisations 
such as GOs and NGOs, to the fore. Such human complexity demands a qualitative “soft systems” 
approach and it is through this methodology, validated by field reports, that a set of critical 
conditions for successful micro generation in support of economic development has been developed. 
By thematic group, they are:  
(1) A holistic approach that sees micro generation as a component of broader economic 
development; 
(2) An environment safe enough for project build and operation, and for the markets necessary for 
wealth creation; 
(3) External support to build community capacity to fund and maintain schemes through-life. 
A range of sub-critical and lower order conditions were also derived. Most validated well 
however the SSM approach produced a new set of conditions highlighting the importance of the 
nature of the OO, the community, its leadership, and their relationships. Conversely, it played down 
the importance of the more progressive ideas of creating autonomous bodies and opening up markets, 
finding these more relevant for states that have already emerged from conflict. The critical conditions 
were also found to have broad relevance for other highly fragile states. Recognising the limitations in 
the desktop nature of this study, the next step is to develop the higher order conditions, in the field, 
before deploying them as part of a comprehensive approach to poverty alleviation in Afghanistan and 
other similar states. 
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